This book concludes by discussing the meeting between Henry Kissinger, at the time considered a bona fide superstar, and Anwar Sadat. During this meeting, where Sadat met the secretary of state for the first time, Sadat discussed at length what drove him to war in October 1973. For Sadat, the failure of the 1969 Rogers Plan convinced him that there would never be a “serious negotiation” so long as Israel equated security with military predominance. He explained to Kissinger how he had grown “disenchanted” with the Soviet Union, as Moscow “prized” its relations with the United States above support of Egypt. The “bland” treatment of the Middle East question in the communique of Nixon's 1972 summit in Moscow had removed any lingering doubts about the Kremlin's commitment to helping Egypt, Sadat maintained, and he demanded the removal of Soviet troops from Egypt in July 1972 “because of the disrespect shown by Soviet leaders toward Egyptians.”
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