The Fallibility of Reason
The Fallibility of Reason
This chapter argues that Bush v. Gore is no different from many other cases decided by the Rehnquist Court. It rejects the claim that its unprincipled character places the decision “on a different moral plane.” It argues that the Court's decision is principled. While those principles are mistaken and wrongly applied to the facts, this is true of many decisions reached by many courts. The fallibility of judicial reason should not shake our collective faith in the rule of law, and in the judicial effort to hold power accountable to principle.
Keywords: Supreme Court, Rehnquist Court, principles
Yale Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
