Hegel, Idealism, and Knowledge
Hegel, Idealism, and Knowledge
This chapter argues that the original, very influential, reaction against idealism by Moore and, to a lesser extent, Russell was based on a precarious grasp of what they intended to reject. The chapter further proposes that their arguments, which are still often accepted without examination or debate as the basis for continuing to reject idealism, are unconvincing. The currently nascent recuperation of Hegel for analytic philosophy also often features a precarious grasp of Hegel's theories. It would be an error to regard the limited analytic turn, or return, to Hegel as a philosophical surrender of principle, an abandonment of basic analytic commitments, an acknowledgment of philosophical error, or as conceding, even implicitly, that the turn away from idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century was incorrect.
Keywords: idealism, Moore, Russell, nascent recuperation, analytic philosophy, analytic turn
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