This chapter argues that the application of prediction markets to administrative agency decision-making offers the possibility of a distinct benefit. It has been observed that prediction markets can be used to aggregate evidence and assessments and to aggregate preferences or at least to aggregate expected preferences. The chapter states that normative prediction markets are promising because they potentially can provide objective guides to policy. The chapter assesses the possibility that the demographics of market participants might have some effects on the results. It argues that prediction markets might be useful in specific contexts in which administrative agencies might otherwise be excessively politicized, such as in assessing governmental spending decisions or in which “capture” by private interests is a significant danger.
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