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Eduardo Barreiros and the Recovery of Spain$

Hugh Thomas

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780300121094

Published to Yale Scholarship Online: October 2013

DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300121094.001.0001

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Disagreement with the Americans

Disagreement with the Americans

(p.213) 28 Disagreement with the Americans
Eduardo Barreiros and the Recovery of Spain

Hugh Thomas

Yale University Press

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter discusses the disagreement of Eduardo with the Chrysler Corporation. At the beginning of 1966, Eduardo was still uttering sweet words about his American partners, at least in public. Chrysler indeed wanted to participate in all the plans for Galicia and to dismantle much of the Barreiros group, selling the dependent companies in order to increase liquidity and concentrate on companies that sold saloon cars. The Chryslerization of Barreiros slowly continued, with new colors and sketches, new emblems and new materials, new pictures and fábricas, even new work clothes, such as those in all Chrysler plants all over the world. Eduardo had been accustomed to using Colombiana de Automoción S.A. for his exports in Colombia, but Chrysler had at its disposal another firm there, Colombiana de Motores S.A., and there was talk not of collaboration but of competition.

Keywords:   Spain, Eduardo, Barreiros Diesel, Chrysler, disagreement

I am in no way in agreement with what the Americans are doing.

Eduardo to Enrique Feijóo, 1967

The visit of General Franco to Villaverde set the seal on an epoch in Eduardo's life. He seemed to have reached the summit of a mountain from which he could see several continents: the past of autarchy, the brilliant present of free enterprise, and a glittering future of international exports. Eduardo seemed confirmed as the favourite industrialist of the government, a man at ease with the ministers and generals who surrounded the head of state and a close friend of the head of state's daughter and son-in-law, Carmen and Cristóbal, Marqués de Villaverde. Several courtiers of General Franco—Pacón (General Franco Salgado), Admiral Nieto Antúnez, and the tall, sonorous-voiced “Tío Pepe” from Valencia (José María Sanchis Sancho), as well as Fuertes de Villavicencio, the deputy head of the civil household—remained shareholders in Barreiros Diesel.

Eduardo and Dorinda Barreiros continued to hold great dinners in their house in Castellana 68. Their daughter, Mariluz, remarked: “The social life of my parents in those years was intense, they would have many engagements, many dinners, a large number of journeys, for business reasons, in northern Europe and the United States. I remember so well the dressing room of my mother, full of wonderful dresses, with her shoes a juego, hats, very elegant overcoats, almost all from Balenciaga or Valentino (although she was always very thrifty and a good organiser).”1

Cavero, however, commented: “For Eduardo, social life had no real interest but, if he went through with it, it was because he knew, in an age of state interventionism, that it was necessary to get permission to produce anything, and the (p.214) administration looked on the private automobile section of the economy with much suspicion. Even to arrange an agreement of technical assistance was extraordinarily complicated.”2

All the same, the beautiful American, Aline, Condesa de Romanones, thought that Eduardo became a focus of social attention because people were interested in meeting someone who had made so much money having started from having so little. His example showed that you too, if you were determined, could change your life.3

But despite his friendships, Eduardo was engaged in a dangerous game in which General Franco and his circle, though they seemed to like him, did not help him, and in which the minister of industry (López Bravo), often thought so enlightened, seemed indifferent. This game was, of course, the contest with Chrysler Corporation.

At the beginning of 1966, Eduardo was still uttering sweet words about his American partners, at least in public. Thus José Antonio Revilla, on January 27, 1966, a few weeks after General Franco's visit to Villaverde, asked him in an interview on television, “Does not your association with Chrysler make you a little fearful? Are you not afraid that in a short time Chrysler will use you in order to establish its entry into Spain?”

Eduardo replied: “The idea of Chrysler is not only for Spain but for other parts of the world to go in with its technical superiority, to arrange to introduce its products but never with the idea of securing a monopoly. As far as we are concerned, Chrysler is giving us a tremendous help. Everything we ask for, they make available.”4 But that reflected only the public Eduardo. In private, he was already disillusioned.

There were, certainly, still a few hiccups in relation to the Dodge: for example, in March 1966, Fernández Baquero wrote, production of the Dodge was halted because many pieces of bodywork were still waiting in the customs house. Fernández Baquero was determined to extract these without waiting for the bill from Chrysler. To that end, with great imagination he invited to dine several officials of the customs as well as Domingo Saavedra, the ex-mayor of Orense who had joined Barreiros Diesel in 1958 and was in 1966 responsible in the company for international trade. These officials' wives were also invited—an unusual gesture in Madrid of that time.

During the dinner, Saavedra bluntly raised the question of the lack of the parts imported from America. The consequence was that, next day at 8 A.M., Barreiros Diesel was given permission to take its cargo out of the customs house. Halfway through the morning, the papers giving permission appeared. The production of (p.215) the Dodge began again.5 This was one of the very few occasions when the regime assisted Eduardo. Once again a dinner was shown to have many uses.

Eduardo was also in these months busy with alternative activities. He seemed to be encouraging his investment company, CIPSA (Compañía Ibérica de Prospecciones S.A.), to interest itself in oil in Fernando Poo, in collaboration with Mobil Oil and CEPSA (Compañía Españla de Petróleos S.A.), an old enemy but one that he now saw as a friend.

Then he was planning some activities in Orense. Juan Miguel Antoñnzas thought that Eduardo knew already in 1965 that his association with Chrysler might end in disaster, especially if he did not pay off the debts occasioned by the expansion of recent years (“one had to swim and look after one's clothes” was one of his favourite comments). So he also established “Eduardo Barreiros Orense S.A.,” financed by the Caja de Ahorros de Orense, at the head of which there was still his old friend “Caito” (Ricardo Martín Esperanza). The hope was to establish seven factories to be concerned with the supply of parts for automotion. They would produce electrical equipment, injection pumps, and gear boxes. Eduardo was seeking to concentrate in Orense all the minor works that he had embarked upon but which he feared Chrysler might absorb.

He offered the job of director-general of these undertakings in Galicia to Fernández Baquero, who had become exasperated by Chrysler. In his stead as director- general of production, there would be Horacio Pérez Vázquez, by now a most experienced manager as well as a scientist. He, Fernández Baquero, and Graciliano spent much of the summer of 1965 trying to establish this range of auxiliary industries. All these undertakings would develop independently of Chrysler.

The press in Orense soon got wind of these ideas. Technicians from Barreiros had visited the Polígono de San Ciprián de Viñas in Orense (the industrial suburb that Eduardo had helped to finance), and the local paper, La Región, had announced that the principal question which Orensanos were putting was, “Is Barreiros coming to Orense? We believe that our reply is categorically ‘yes.’”6

In March 1966, the Barreiros family went for Semana Santa in Málaga in Eduardo's Beechcraft aeroplane, and Carranza and Fernández Baquero accompanied them. Saying good-bye to the latter in the airport at Málaga, Eduardo said: “Santiago, on our return you must begin to work with Barreiros in Orense and we shall ask Pérez Vázquez to succeed you.”

On their return, Fernández Baquero accepted the invitation.7

The day of the meeting of the shareholders, Eduardo said to Ferníndez Baquero: “We are going to tell them [the shareholders] that Galicia Industrial will (p.216) definitely be the future for our clients.” Then Eduardo asked him, “What shall we tell Chrysler about Barreiros Orense?”

A few hours later, at about nine in the evening, after shareholders had met, Eduardo summoned Fernández Baquero to his office. “Eduardo was sitting with his feet on a chair [a most unusual position for him], his head back, as he often sat in difficult moments, and he said with sadness:

“They have done us in!” (¡Nos han jodido!)

“What's happened?”

“They want to take over everything.” Fernández Baquero later explained: “Chrysler wants also to control the companies in Orense.” Chrysler indeed wanted to participate in all the plans for Galicia, and to dismantle much of the Barreiros group, selling the dependent companies in order to “increase liquidity” and concentrate on companies that sold saloon cars.

Actually for months nothing changed, the new “assistants” at the side of the directors-general made little impression, Fernández Baquero remained, there were innumerable discussions as to whether perhaps the old system might not all the same have something to be said for it. But the “Chryslerisation” of Barreiros slowly continued, with “new colours and sketches, new emblems and new materials, new pictures and fábricas, even new work clothes, like those in all Chrysler plants all over the world.”8

The irony is that the old products of old Barreiros Diesel were selling spectacularly well in 1966. In May, Eduardo gave a press conference in which he described how, in the previous twelve months, they had doubled their manufacture of industrial vehicles—mainly trucks—and were making 6,000 of them a year of all weights, from five to thirty-eight tons, and how they were exporting to thirty countries. No Spanish manufacturer had ever done that before.

Eduardo also explained that he had talked with the directors of SAVA, the motor manufacturers of Valladolid, to buy the shares of that company and, though the negotiations had reached a “good conclusion, at the last moment a series of problems had arisen which torpedoed this arrangement the responsibility for which had been Pegaso [i.e., ENASA].”

Eduardo had thought that the concentration of SAVA and Barreiros in a single hand—his hand, naturally—would have made Spain the first manufacturer of industrial vehicles in all Europe—especially if he could ally with ENASA too.9

The story of Eduardo's adventure with SAVA deserves special attention. The Sava Company of Valladolid (Sociedad Anónima de Vehículos Automóviles) had been established in October 1957 with a capital of 24 million pesetas. Most of the shares were in the hands of Francesco Scrimieri Margotti or his family. He had been born in Lecce, had lived in Taranto, and then went to Turin. In 1937, aged (p.217) twenty-four, he had gone to Valladolid as a technician of FIAT. He married a girl from Bilbao, and remained in Spain thereafter. In 1942, he founded a small aluminium factory FADA (Fábrica de Artículos de Aluminio) to make various articles for the kitchen but also industrial pieces such as reels of aluminium for the silk trade. Scrimieri became a prominent figure in the economic life of Valladolid and acted as Italian honorary consul in that city.

Always interested in motors, he wanted to make a three-wheeler. His son Cosme described the three-wheeler as “the child of FADA.” He founded SAVA (Sociedad Anónima de Vehículos de Automoción) 1957 for that purpose. He applied to the Ministry of Industry for permission to make 1,000 vehicles a year, using the EB-4 of Barreiros Diesel of 3,200 cubic centimeters as a motor. But the minister of industry refused him. Then, in the summer of 1957, he gained approval for a motocarro (three-wheeler) that was capable of being driven from Zaragoza to Valladolid at an average of fifty kilometres an hour with a load of 1,500 kilogrammes. Scrimieri tried to propagate a four-wheeler of the same kind.

On February 16, 1959, the ministry approved SAVA's manufacture of 500 threewheelers and also 1,000 four-wheel trucks that had an EB-4 diesel motor from Barreiros. It was an immediate success.10 They also began to make vans, as well as tractors, under the licence of the British Motor Corporation and in 1964 some heavy trucks under the licence of the French firm of Berliet—the former holding 3.6 percent of the shares and the latter 7.7 percent. By 1966 there were about 1,650 men working at the SAVA factory in Valladolid.11

Eduardo and Scrimieri, meantime, became friends. The former sold motors to the latter, who in turn made pistons for Eduardo. Eduardo was developing a vision of just one large Spanish enterprise making saloon cars and lorries that would eventually dominate the European market. After some weeks of discussion, beginning at the end of April 1966, Scrimieri, still the managing director of SAVA, agreed to sell. SAVA was short of money and the situation therefore was causing difficulties for Scrimieri. A loan of 90 million pesetas agreed by the Banco de Crédito Industrial never arrived.12 Íñigo Cavero, the legal adviser to Eduardo, sent an ultimatum: “Friday or out.” It was decided that Eduardo would go to a meeting on May 27, 1966, in Villaverde in which the arrangements would be concluded. But on May 26, the day before the meeting, “on hearing of SAVA's contacts with Barreiros [Diesel]” the directors of Finanzauto, a bank in the control of the Ministry of Industry that was responsible for the distribution of the products of SAVA as well as the Pegaso trucks, called on Scrimieri and suggested that SAVA ought to put itself in touch with the directors of ENASA. Scrimieri was summoned in the morning of May 27 by the same men from Finanzauto.

A meeting began at 11 A.M. and went on in ENASA's headquarters in the Calle (p.218) Lagasca until the early hours of the next day. Present were representatives of ENASA and Finanzauto. A contract was signed. It seemed always to the Scrimieri family that López Bravo, the minister of industry, had intervened to arrange that the shares that SAVA had proposed to sell to Eduardo should be bought by ENASA. Meantime, Eduardo waited at Villaverde with his lawyers, but Scrimieri never appeared.

This was one of the more high-handed procedures of the ministry: rude as well as intemperate. Scrimieri and Eduardo never met again. The whole incident was a reminder to Eduardo that he still had bitter enemies within the regime as well as new ones from across the ocean.13

One conversation of this time deserves to be recalled. This was Eduarclo's talk with Enrique Feijóo, the clever Orensano who had helped so much to promote Barreiros Diesel in the 1950s, and who had resigned to work with Nestlé, Mexico, as director of publicity. Feijóo visited Eduardo, who said to him, “Come and work with us again.” But Feijóo knew from talking with people in Chrysler-Mexico that Chrysler was “acquisitive” and he asked Eduardo, “How long will you be president of Barrieros Diesel?”Eduardo replied, “I don't know but I am in no way in agreement with what the Americans are doing.”14

What he specifically meant was the slow “Americanisation” of his great Spanish fábrica. But there were other conflicts: first, Chrysler turned out to be uninterested in the manufacture of trucks in Europe except for their own Dodge “small trucks.” They did not even seem to mind that in France FIAT should control the industrial division of SIMCA. It is true that SIMCA had had an old association with FIAT, but this was a new development. All the achievements of Eduardo and Barreiros Diesel, from the moment of the abuelo's victory in Portugal, were forgotten.

Then there was the question of the dependent companies, the so-called filiales. Eduardo was more interested in the Latin American export market than that in Europe and Africa (except Egypt). But in Latin America, Barreiros Diesel's plans clashed with Chrysler's established interests. Instead of receiving the support of Chrysler for his exports, he found himself in competition with it. For example, Eduardo wanted to start making tractors in Mexico. But Minett, one of the more serene of the Chrysler men in Europe, pointed out that such an activity would compete with AUTO-MEX, a firm that also made tractors and in which Chrysler had invested.

Then Eduardo had been accustomed to use Colombiana de Automoción S.A. for his exports in Colombia, but Chrysler had at its disposal another firm there, Colombiana de Motores S.A., and there was, therefore, again talk not of collaboration but of competition.

(p.219) Finally, there was also argument as to the best way to finance projects. Eduardo had established EFISA (Entidad de Financiación S.A.) in 1963, before his understanding with Chrysler, to finance the sale of vehicles by instalments. But Chrysler thought it inadequate and wanted to form a new finance company. So it created COFIC (Compañía Internacional de Financiación y Crédito) with a capital of 100 million pesetas.15 In its first year, that amount permitted the formation of twenty-six sales agencies. The relative success of this body did not endear it to Eduardo, who saw it as ruining his own old empire.

Then the financial problems of Barreiros Diesel, soothed after the arrival of Chrysler's money, revived. The failure to sell the Simca and the Dodge in the expected numbers had inspired a real crisis. In July 1966, Eduardo himself put it thus: “The sales began to decline so quickly that, within two months, the company ran out of cash and had to resort to an … urgent loan, followed immediately by a capital increase of two billion [pesetas], made possible by a one-billion [peseta] loan extended to the Barreiros family by the Banco de Crédito Industrial…. Our family's faith in the company, both now and for the future, was so great that we never once hesitated to put all we had behind it.”16

Eduardo was at his best in this crisis. Thus he established a centre to give courses related to the sale of vehicles. A manual “de organización comercial de ventas de automóviles” was inspired by Carlos Otero Insua, the new director of sales. It demanded salesmen with good human qualities.17 Eduardo wrote to the existing “salesmen” to persuade them to participate in the course that he had arranged. But salespeople are often eccentric if original individuals. They rejected the idea that they could benefit from courses on subjects which they considered that they knew well.18

The fábrica's public activities, however, all the same seemed to continue to shine with energy that year: thus there was not only a bullfight with the toreros coming from the factory, there was a pilgrimage of workers and their wives to Santiago de Compostela—the procession headed of course by Eduardo and Dorinda. There was too an exhibition where forty-two workers at Villaverde showed 206 paintings. Three Barreiros Prizes, worth half a million pesetas each, were offered for journalism, art, and literature. In November a specific Barreiros Prize for poetry was founded. The second prize was won by Joaquín Marcos Fernández, who had written an ambitious industrial poem “La Industriada,” “an epic poem in five cantos.”19 The author was asked, “How do you see the present time in Spanish poetry?” “Very feeble,” was his reply.20

In June 1966, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia made a visit to Villaverde during a state expedition to Spain, saying that he was delighted to know that the company was collaborating with the development of his kingdom; and in November, a report (p.220) came that Eduardo's Panter III had enjoyed the best results in a competition for the Saudi armed forces (defeating Berliet of France and General Motors of the United States). The test had included a drive of a hundred and fifty miles across the desert.21

King Faisal's declaration at Villaverde in the golden book of visitors deserves to be remembered: “In the name of all mighty God: It is a pleasure for me to express the admiration that I have for everything that I have seen in this factory…. It is a pleasure to know that this entity is ready to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in its industrial development. I thank the president of the factory for his reception, his welcome and his generosity. God guide the entity in the continuation of its good work.”22

After the summer, in September 1966, two matters seemed to dominate Barreiros Diesel: the decline of demand, as much of the new products as of the old ones, with the consequent increase of stocks, and materials stored in the warehouses; second, the realisation that the factory in Villaverde had an excessive number of employees. A general drive for economy was embarked upon, from the provision of pens to carbon paper. Those who were most affected were those who had joined most recently and who had abandoned good jobs to do so and were now disillusioned. This began a gradual deterioration of the good name of the company with the general public.

There were also some disputes and quarrels. Carranza went to see Fernández Baquero, who said that there was no reason to despair, but that the increase in the capital in the “amounts required for it to be truly effective would mean the Chairman would lose his majority shareholding, which would give [Chrysler] control of company governance and management.”23 And even if only for the sake of patriotism, that had to be avoided at all costs.

Eduardo was trying now to arrange with the Banco de Crédito a loan that would enable him to achieve the capital needed, without losing his majority of shares (to Chrysler). But he did not achieve that. After a long conversation between Habib and the chairman (Eduardo), the company (Chrysler) agreed to act as surety, without requiring any compensation in return.

While the relations between the two wings of Barreiros Diesel simmered, a surprising development occurred: syndical elections of a relatively open nature. The Boletín de la Empresa published the names of, and short interviews with, the candidates in Barreiros Diesel. A typical exchange was thus (this was with a certain Sabino Arranz Aparicio):

“Why did you not present yourself on other occasions?”

“Really I never thought of it and I didn't on this occasion myself, it is the fault of my companions.”

(p.221) “Well then aren't you making propaganda?”

“As a matter of fact, no. If the people consider that I am worth something, let them vote for me.”

“And if you are elected what will you do?”

“Everything I can for my comrades, in the frame of justice and without damaging the business, and to avoid any possible obstruction between the management and the workers.”24 (He did not win.)25

But such elections did not indicate any serious change in the nature of the regime, and nor did the elections affect Barreiros Diesel, where in November for the first time the news that all was not well in the company made headlines: for, on the fifth of that month, the public read in their newspapers the headline “Barreiros is going through a serious crisis.” The Simca 1000 had sold only modestly, and 1,000 workers had been dismissed, most of them being heads of families. They had been earning between 6,000 and 7,000 pesetas a month. Barreiros Diesel had paid the dismissed men fifteen days' wages as compensation. If the sales of Simca picked up, Eduardo promised, those workers would be restored. But in the meantime, they had recourse to the labour courts.26

The problems of the Simca were nothing to those encountered by the Dodge. It simply was not selling. There were many reasons, most being out of Eduardo's control: first, after five years of continuous success, 1966–68 in Spain marked a downturn in financial optimism. In addition the engine seemed to make too much noise. Then the Dodge's roof was rather low and so there was a problem of space (it was the kind of mistake which no Chrysler designer would have made in the days of Kaufman Keller). In addition, a large American car was ceasing to be a sign of prestige in Europe. People were even coming to despise it. Further, the Dodge was too expensive. There was too the contrasting point that affected the matter: in those days, a good Spanish car—which the Dodge became after being assembled at Villaverde—always seemed to many inferior to its equivalent made abroad.

In the middle of 1966, it was becoming increasingly obvious that the indebtedness of Barreiros was worsened by the need to buy so many parts for the Dodge. Leaving on one side the Orense project (which had been formally established, despite the difficulties, in September 1967), there was no other possibility for Eduardo than to inspire an increase in sales.27

In the summer of 1966, Eduardo and Carranza visited many of the concessionaries. Eduardo's Beechcraft aeroplane permitted them to see at least two of them a day. But that did not serve much; “the difficulty did not lie with the concessionaries but with the fact that the Dodge market was saturated.”28

In September, after a few days of recovery in the magic climate of La Toja, (p.222) with its magnificent hotel on the water, Eduardo returned to the factory. In his brief absence, it seemed that Chrysler had contrived to dominate the working of the place and it remained for its leaders only to isolate Eduardo and to demand the resignations of both Carranza and Fernández Baquero, who, they knew, had criticised them unmercifully.29 Chrysler was now conducting itself as if its 45 percent share in the firm were really 51 percent.

Fernández Baquero remembered the end of his time in Barreiros Diesel rather differently: in December 1966, he said, he proposed to Eduardo that he should take a year off to dedicate himself to a company, BATANO, which his recently dead father had founded in 1965, in his native León, to distribute the saloon cars of Barreiros. Eduardo knew that he would not return, for the firm to which he had devoted so much was then in the hands of Chrysler and he didn't want “to work in a circus.”30

Fariña commented, “The notice of the dismissal caused a profound impression because nobody was under any illusion but that it had been entirely caused by American pressure [impulso americano].”31

The eclipse of Carranza was equally distressing. Less popular than Fernández Baquero, his administrative capacity and financial quickness had, however, been much admired—not least by the Banco de Vizcaya. He himself commented years later: “The automobiles were a great distraction. They complicated everything. The Dodge was too big for Spain of that time, but the Simca worked perfectly well.” He, Carranza, said that he saw the danger of Chrysler at the beginning: “I resisted Chrysler. Chrysler vetoed everything. So I realised that there was nothing else to do, and I left.” He had been for several years the “right hand” of Eduardo so far as finance was concerned and so he could find no place in the new Chrysler undertaking. He admitted that “Chrysler maintained the forms of good behaviour but [he] had nothing further to do with them.”32

Roy had written of him in a letter to Bordegeray in 1963: “In the long experience which I have had of dealing with Carranza, I have learned that he is a perfectly honest and very realistic man who in respect of the affairs of banks always carried out what he had undertaken to do…. It was very reassuring to know that all the commercial and financial side of the group's work had been confided to him.”33

The novelist Fariña well described the sad departure from Barreiros Diesel of Carranza who, being at that time director de administración, “was completely ignorant of what was being planned for him. He believed that once the matter of the increase of capital had been resolved, that, as he had devoted good service to the company, all would be reestablished on the old basis.”34

Then he was called in by Eduardo, who told him of the agreement that had (p.223) been reached with the Chrysler people, and Eduardo invited him, in the name of maintaining harmony in future, to make a sacrifice and he asked for his voluntary resignation. Carranza was for a moment speechless, then reacted angrily, speaking of his contribution to the work of Barreiros Diesel and saying that it was obviously a trick of the Americans (una canallada de los yanquis).

“Eduardo calmed him down and went into a number of explanations and promised him a good financial compensation.”35

A few days later, Eduardo spoke to the finance committee: sitting between Jack Charipar (then Chrysler's adviser to Fernández Quintas) and Carranza, he explained how, in return for an increase of capital, Chrysler had asked for greater participation and indeed the creation of a finance committee. Its establishment had led to Carranza's resignation, which he, Eduardo, much regretted. He added that the new year, 1967, was going to be a hard year.36

With the eclipse of Fernández Baquero and Carranza, Barreiros Diesel entered a new stage of its history, and it never recovered.


(1) . Testimony of Mariluz Barreiros.

(2) . Testimony of Íñigo Cavero.

(3) . Testimony of Aline, Condesa de Romamones.

(4) . Informaciones (Madrid), January 27, 1966.

(5) . Fernández Baquero memorandum, 17, in the possession of the author.

(6) . Unattributed press cutting c. March 30, 1966, in páginas sueltas, 25, Barreiros Archive.

(7) . Fernández Baquero memorandum, 21.

(8) . Fariña, Los invasores, 123.

(9) . MEBUM FB 0722, páginas sueltas, 26, Barreiros Archive.

(10) . See García Ruiz, Sobre ruedas, 62, for other investors.

(11) . Summary in the report of the administration 1966–1970, “Nueva orientación empresarial y proyección internacional,” 209.

(12) . Letter of Scrimieri of June 24, 1966, to Ignacio Muñoz Rojas. Also a letter from Rosario Scrimieri to the author of March 2, 2005, and her subsequent comments.

(13) . Testimony of Cosme and Rosario Scrimieri.

(14) . Testimony of Feijóo.

(15) . COFIC was constituted February 1, 1966, with a capital of 100 million pesetas, subscribed to by BD 60 percent; Boston Oversea Finance Corporation, 10 percent; and 6 (p.354) percent from the following: La Banque de l'Union Parisienne, Compagnie Financière et Industrielle, Finanziamenti Scambi ed Anticipazioni, and the Union Financière de Paris. Eduardo was president and the vocales were Valeriano, Graciliano, Celso, Arthur Cole, Habib, Lindhorst, Carranza, Gilberte Beaux, Federico Bruno, Charles Dumont, Jean Lamson, Cavero, who was secretary, and a Bostonian representative. The aim was sales a plazos. Chrysler ran this. It later became Chrysler Corporación Financiera S.A. (García Ruiz y Santos, ¡Es una motor español!, 164–317).

(16) . ADE 297/4, Barreiros Archive.

(17) . García Ruiz y Santos, ¡Es una motor español!, 258.

(18) . Ibid.

(19) . Boletín de la Empresa, November 1, 1966.

(20) . Boletín de la Empresa, November 1967.

(21) . Informaciones, June 20, 1968.

(22) . From a document in the possession of the author, FAISAL 27 Safar de 1386 (June 16, 1966).

(23) . Testimony of Ramón Carranza.

(24) . Boletín de la Empresa, October 1, 1966.

(25) . Boletín de la Empresa, September 15, 1966.

(26) . MEBUM FB 0798, páginas sueltas, 26, Barreiros Archive.

(27) . In May 1966 one new subsidiary company of Barreiros Diesel was founded. This was AYTEMISA (Aire y Temperatura S.A.), whose purpose was to make the air-conditioning system for the Dodge deluxe. Habib was the president. Director-general was José Antonio Medina Cubillos, who was soon succeeded by Charles H. Palmer.

(28) . Testimony of Santiago Fernández Baquero.

(29) . Comment of Fernández Quintas.

(30) . Fernández Baquero memorandum, 19.

(31) . Fariña, Los invasores, 72–73.

(32) . Testimony of Carranza.

(33) . Roy to Bordegaray, in Banco de Vizcaya Archive.

(34) . Testimony of José Fariña.

(35) . Fariña, Los invasores, 76.

(36) . Ibid., 78–79.