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The Unitary ExecutivePresidential Power from Washington to Bush$

Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780300121261

Published to Yale Scholarship Online: October 2013

DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300121261.001.0001

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Lyndon B. Johnson

Lyndon B. Johnson

(p.337) 36 Lyndon B. Johnson
The Unitary Executive

Steven G. Calabresi

Christopher S. Yoo

Yale University Press

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter describes the legendary personality of Lyndon B. Johnson that eliminated all doubt regarding whether he would be a strong chief executive or not. Johnson ascended to the presidency under extraordinarily difficult conditions, having to succeed a charismatic leader who, after capturing the imagination of the country, died under tragic circumstances. Having sworn to continue Kennedy's vision, Johnson inherited a fully staffed executive branch to which he could not make significant changes without seeming to abandon Kennedy's legacy. Although he was respectfully slow to make significant changes to the administration, it would be a mistake to construe his reticence to change personnel as hesitancy to exert full control over the workings of the executive branch. When Adlai Stevenson complained that he really wanted to be secretary of state rather than an errand boy, Walter Lippman quipped, “If you are Lyndon Johnson's secretary of state, you'll be an errand boy.”

Keywords:   legendary personality, Lyndon B. Johnson, strong chief executive, Kennedy's legacy, Adlai Stevenson, Walter Lippman, errand boy

Anyone familiar with Lyndon Johnson's legendary personality would have little doubt that he would be a strong chief executive. That said, Johnson ascended to the presidency under extraordinarily difficult conditions, having to succeed a charismatic leader who, after capturing the imagination of the country, died under tragic circumstances. Having sworn to continue Kennedy's vision, Johnson inherited a fully staffed executive branch to which he could not make significant changes without seeming to abandon Kennedy's legacy. For instance, in order to associate his antipoverty campaign with Kennedy, Johnson appointed Kennedy's brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver, to head the War on Poverty. In what would become typical Johnson operating procedure, when Shriver hesitated over accepting and asked for time to decide, Johnson telephoned him and “in a very low, confidential sounding voice, the President explained that he had the Cabinet with him and had to keep his voice down. ‘You just have to understand, Sargent, this is your President speaking, and I'm going to announce you as the head of the war against poverty. Boom,’ Johnson hung up. Shriver turned to his wife and said: ‘Looks as if I'm going to be the new head of the war against poverty.’”1

Although Johnson was respectfully slow to make significant changes to the administration, it would be a mistake to construe his reticence to change (p.338) personnel as hesitancy to exert full control over the workings of the executive branch. When Adlai Stevenson complained that he really wanted to be secretary of state rather than an errand boy, Walter Lippman quipped, “If you are Lyndon Johnson's secretary of state, you'll be an errand boy.”2

Clearly, Johnson was confident that he and he alone would determine the direction of his administration. In fact, one of the foremost considerations in Johnson's appointment policy was his ability to control his subordinates. Perhaps the plainest example of this policy occurred when Johnson made his choice of a vice presidential running mate in the 1964 election campaign. By that time it was well understood among vice presidential potentials that “a Johnson Vice President would need to be a ‘yes man’ who conformed to LBJ's every wish. ‘Whoever he is,’ Johnson told people in 1964, ‘I want his pecker … in my pocket.’” When Johnson finally decided upon Hubert Humphrey, the offer was accompanied by a demand for unequivocal loyalty. The president instructed Humphrey: “You can be against me in our conferences until … I make up my mind … then I want you to follow my policies.” Johnson reiterated that Humphrey had to “understand that this is like a marriage with no chance of divorce. I need complete and unswerving loyalty.” The bottom line was that “Johnson hated criticism or any challenge to his authority. Everyone who worked for him was expected to be 100 percent a Johnson man, a loyalist who, whatever his inner thoughts, would subordinate his views and ambitions to Johnson's. This is not to say that Johnson wanted only ciphers around him. To the contrary, he valued having the services of ‘the best and the brightest.’ But at the same time, he wanted them to bend the knee, to take a back seat, to subordinate themselves to the President…. ‘I want people around me,’ Johnson said repeatedly, ‘who would kiss my ass on a hot summer's day and say it smells like roses.’”3

Johnson's biographer Vaughn Davis Bornet reports that while “Hubert Humphrey talked to the President at length upon occasion, he could not count on prevailing,” and neither could anyone else. Bornet adds that during his years in office, President Johnson ran the executive branch and—after listening to much advice—made thousands of final decisions himself, while delegating masses of detail in administration to those whom he fully trusted. “Together, the eager president and his ambitious team in the executive branch dominated the federal government from 1963 to 1969.”4

In another example of Johnson's insistence on fierce loyalty from subordinates, when it came time to appoint a head of his cabinet Department of Housing and Urban Development, everyone expected Johnson to select Robert Weaver, administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, as the first black cabinet member. Before giving him the post, however, as (p.339) Joseph Califano, one of Johnson's closest aides, recalled, Johnson “made it clear he could break or make Weaver—by doing both. He gave me a glimpse of the trait that sometimes drove him to crush and reshape a man before placing him in a job of enormous importance, much the way a ranch hand tames a wild horse before mounting it. To Johnson, this technique helped assure that an appointee was his alone.”5 And when it became clear that he did not “own” his subordinates, Johnson dismissed them forthwith, as in the case of Robert MacNamara, who made the mistake of disagreeing with the president's policy in Vietnam.

Johnson was a workaholic who wanted to outdo his predecessors in every possible way, including in the field of foreign affairs. Bornet reports that Johnson counted every meeting he had had with a foreign head of state compared with those of his four predecessors and was pleased that he far exceeded them, particularly in meetings held outside the United States. Johnson was also very aware “that his was the finger on the button” for starting a nuclear war, and he insisted “that the buck would stop with him on matters involving central war or peace.”6

Johnson micromanaged law execution in a way that certainly asserted presidential power, but to a degree that would be seen as offensive today. Bornet reports, “When an FBI agent hesitated to check the phone records of the Republican vice-presidential candidate, Spiro Agnew, Johnson himself ‘came on the phone and proceeded to remind [the agent] that he was commander in chief and he should get what he wanted.’ Johnson aides used presidential powers to push agents to check on matters they thought promising.” Bornet adds that “President Johnson was a person who inhaled every detail of the national budget, kept track of the votes and predilections of even the most obscure congressman, and had time to find out many obscure things.” He was certainly aware of the extralegal surveillance activities of the FBI, and he knew about the secret taping of phone conversations “in the Oval Office, for it was done by a secretary on his signal…. National safety and, sometimes, personal power were placed above the Constitution and the law in those years.”7

Notwithstanding Johnson's great attention to details, the administration of many of the programs in his war on poverty was surprisingly poor. Bornet reports that the “administration of the [Office of Economic Opportunity] proved to be a nightmare” and that “‘anti-poverty programs became political pork-barrel-type programs and were taken over by sophisticated middle-class bureaucrats.’” These administrative problems became all the more significant because the total number of federal employees increased from 1,100,000 in 1963 to 1,300,000 in 1969, and two new cabinet departments, Housing (p.340) and Urban Development (HUD) and Transportation, were added during the Johnson years. “The cumulative effect of Great Society legislation was to produce far greater problems of executive structure and coordination than had existed at any other time, except perhaps during the Civil War, the Great Depression, and World War II. The problems were permanent, ‘threatening the capacity of the administrative system to fulfill policy objectives.’”8

The Johnson years were also marked by the assassinations of Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., and Robert Kennedy, as well as many other threats to the faithful execution of federal laws. Bornet observes that Johnson was surprisingly lax in his law execution efforts in response to some of these threats, in part because of the liberal outlook of his attorneys general. Bornet states, “Riots, mass demonstrations, and defiance of the federal government's authority to draft youths for military service combined to make law enforcement difficult. Johnson accepted the burden with marked reluctance, given his public emphasis on positive factors. His attorney generals [sic] knew that the law of the land had to be enforced, but they hoped that, somehow, expenditures on education, money for better food and housing, and a multitude of services would keep crime from growing.” This laxity in law enforcement was surprising because in all other respects during the Johnson years “the executive branch … developed, in the hands of this leader and his associates, into a dynamic administrative unit never likely to be equaled.”9

Johnson also strongly resisted attempts by Congress to limit his authority to administer the laws. For example, Congress passed a bill in 1966 that purported to restrict the president's authority to propose a financial plan for agricultural research for fiscal year 1968.10 Johnson indicated that he would ignore the provision as an improper infringement upon executive power by stating, “The provision thus clearly intrudes upon the Executive function of preparing the annual budget. In developing the budget for fiscal 1968, I will give careful consideration to the view of Congress expressed in this act—but I will propose an agricultural research program designed and financed to make the best possible use of the resources available to us.”11 Two months later, after the secretary of commerce exercised his authority under the Export Control Act of 1961 to impose export controls on leather and cattle hides, Congress attached a rider to the Commerce Department's appropriations bill prohibiting the department from using any appropriated funds to enforce the export controls.12 Johnson complained that “in this rider … Congress attempts to control the manner in which the Export Control Act is to be administered.” These objections notwithstanding, Johnson signed the bill; foreign demand for hides had fallen to the point where the secretary (p.341) was planning to drop the controls anyway. However, since conditions might again require the imposition of export controls on leather, Johnson directed the secretary of commerce and the director of the budget to submit legislation removing this restriction.13

The following year, Johnson objected that three provisions of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1968 were “inconsistent with the sound management of America's military establishment and raise[d] questions concerning the constitutional separation of powers.” These provisions prohibited Johnson from closing the Naval Academy's dairy farm, froze the present geographic boundaries and headquarters of the eleven Naval Districts, and prohibited the Department of the Army from closing a particular installation in Hawaii.14 Johnson's signing statement dripped with sarcasm when he quipped, “Thus the Congress, which has given the Navy Department authority over the world's most powerful fleet, has withdrawn the Department's authority over 380 cows.”15 In the end, however, the dairy remained open.

Johnson also issued more general directives to the executive officers, such as his order to continue the antidiscrimination and affirmative action programs begun during the Kennedy administration. This order expanded the Kennedy administration's program in two significant ways. First, it applied the antidiscrimination prohibitions to all of a contractor's activities during the performance of the contract, not just those activities connected with the contract. Second, it expanded the program to include sex discrimination as well. Like Kennedy, Johnson did not rely upon his defense or procurement powers as the basis for his actions, nor did he rely upon the newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964. Instead, Johnson followed Kennedy's example and simply invoked “the authority vested in [him] as President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States.”16 Courts and commentators have struggled to determine whether Johnson issued the order pursuant to statutory authority or under his implied powers as president.17 Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 raised a whole new round of questions about the propriety of these executive orders. Opponents of the executive order argued that in passing Title VII, which is the portion of the act dealing with employment discrimination, Congress had explicitly prohibited the use of quotas, preempting the president's authority, and that the House's failure to pass an amendment explicitly authorizing the executive antidiscrimination program suggested that it was unauthorized. The order's supporters pointed out that the Senate's failure to pass an amendment that would have explicitly provided that Title VII constituted the exclusive remedy for discrimination bolstered (p.342) the imposition of additional antidiscrimination protection.18 Regardless of how this controversy is resolved, Johnson's actions clearly indicate that he believed he had the authority to direct the manner in which the subordinate executive officers executed the laws.

Johnson also pioneered what would emerge as a critical device in allowing the president to control the execution of the law when he began using the oversight responsibilities of the Bureau of the Budget to influence the development of important agency regulations.19 Thus, Johnson plainly had little doubt about his authority to control the execution of the laws. It is symptomatic of Johnson's views that he “pocket vetoed a bill creating an independent maritime administration, and thus the Maritime Administration remained in the Department of Commerce.”20

Johnson exerted his influence over the independent agencies as well. When he met with the heads of the commissions shortly after taking office, his remarks indicated a broad view of presidential responsibility and left little doubt that presidential intervention would be forthcoming if and when the commissions failed to discharge their responsibilities in a manner consistent with the president's policies.21 Consistent with this vision, Johnson directed the heads of three commissions involved in the regulation of transportation to begin intra-agency consultations on their problems. A Bureau of the Budget circular also established guidelines on the responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission and other executive agencies in the acquisition of water data.22 In addition, “Johnson, ever the New Dealer faithful to the conviction that consolidation of control in the executive assured greater economy and efficiency, intended to create a Department of Transportation responsible for all phases of national mobility and safety.” And in an attempt to make the nation's cities more habitable, Johnson created the cabinet-level Department of Housing and Urban Development. He severely cut NASA's budget and made certain to have “Johnson men” in the State Department “to be sure those damned fools didn't do something stupid.”23

Furthermore, Johnson ardently opposed the legislative veto as an unconstitutional infringement on the unitary executive. Rather than vetoing bills with legislative vetoes embedded in them, Johnson tended to use signing statements to construe the legislation in a manner that preserved its constitutionality. For example, within the first few weeks of his administration, Johnson criticized a provision of the Public Works Appropriation Act that prohibited the Panama Canal Company from disposing of any real property without obtaining the prior approval of congressional committees.24 Condemning the committee veto as either “an unconstitutional delegation to Congressional committees of powers which reside only in the Congress as a (p.343) whole, or an attempt to confer executive powers on the committees in violation of the principle of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution,” Johnson directed the secretary of the army to treat the provision as a request for information rather than a formal committee veto.25

Similarly, in signing the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1964,26 Johnson objected to two legislative veto provisions. One provision, he stated, “seeks to give either the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry or the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry a veto power over certain proposed dispositions of foreign currencies accruing from sales under Public Law 480. The other seeks to prevent the President from making certain loans at interest rates below a specified level unless he has concurrence of an advisory committee composed in part of Members of Congress and in part of his own executive appointees.” Since “both such provisions represented a clear violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers,” Johnson directed executive officials to keep Congress informed and consult with them on all aspects of the law.27

Later that same month, Johnson signed legislation requiring that the rules and regulations prescribed by the director of central intelligence for the establishment and maintenance of a new Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System were not to take effect until approved by the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Armed Services Committees.28 Johnson noted that “such a provision attempts to confer executive powers on the members of the legislative branch, in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.” Accordingly, Johnson instructed the director to “treat the provision as a request for consultation with the named committee members.”29

Johnson's opposition to legislative vetoes was so strong that he refused to accept provisions first enacted during the Eisenhower administration that prohibited Congress from appropriating funds for particular uses unless a particular committee had given its prior approval, on the grounds that such provisions were the functional equivalents of legislative vetoes. Because Congress is free to establish its own rules of procedure, and these provisions served to limit only the discretion of Congress before it enacted legislation and not the discretion of the executive branch after legislation had been enacted, Eisenhower had accepted such provisions as constitutional. When confronted with such a provision in the Water Resources Research Act of 1964,30 Johnson directed the secretary of the interior not to request any funds under the act. Although Johnson acknowledged that such provisions were technically constitutional, he still objected to them in principle and refused to implement the act until Congress eventually amended (p.344) the legislation to remove the committee approval provision.31 Johnson later went so far as to veto legislation containing such a provision, concluding that such committee approval “seriously violates the spirit of the division of powers between the legislative and executive branches” and “infringes upon the responsibilities of the executive branch.” As Johnson reasoned, “The executive branch is given, by the Constitution, the responsibility to implement all laws—a specific and exclusive responsibility which cannot be shared with a committee of Congress.” Johnson accordingly withheld his approval from the bill until the offending provision was removed.32 Similarly, Johnson objected to a provision in the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act providing that “no appropriation shall be made to construct, operate or maintain [certain water resource development projects] if such project has not been approved by resolutions adopted by the Committees on Public Works of the Senate and the House of Representatives.”33 Johnson concluded that acceding to such a provision “would make the President a partner in the abdication of a fundamental principle of our Government—the separation of powers prescribed by the United States Constitution,” which “would dilute and diminish the authority and powers of the Presidency.” Unlike the previous provision, the provision contained in this legislation was optional rather than obligatory. Because nothing in the act prevented Johnson from signing it and then directing his administration not to exercise the authority provided by the act until the provision was removed, Johnson concluded that the better course would be to sign the bill so that the remaining legislative provisions could be enacted.34

The following year, Johnson criticized a provision that prohibited Congress from appropriating funds for rural-renewal loans unless the loans had been approved by the Agriculture Committees.35 Johnson called such provisions “repugnant to the Constitution. They represent an improper encroachment by the Congress and its committees upon executive responsibilities, and dilute and diminish the authority and powers of the Presidency.” Therefore, Johnson directed the appropriate departments to submit corrective legislation and ordered his administration not to approve any loans that would require committee approval.36

Finally, Johnson even objected to a type of provision that every previous president had agreed was constitutional: the “report and wait” provision. He indicated that he would accept that a “reasonable 30-day period of notification” be given to congressional committees. The proposed Military Construction Act, however, required that the administration wait 120 days. Although the bill was technically not unconstitutional, Johnson nonetheless vetoed the bill, condemning it as “repugnant to the Constitution” and “a (p.345) fundamental encroachment on one of the great principles of the American Constitutional system—the separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive branches.” Johnson continued, “By the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President…. [The President] cannot sign into law a bill which substantially inhibits him from performing his duty.” As a result, Johnson concluded that “the limitations upon … the executive branch of the government here sought to be imposed are a clear violation of separation of powers…. The Congress enacts the laws. Their execution must be left to the President.” It is “the President [who] is responsible … for the faithful execution of the laws enacted by Congress.” Johnson supported his conclusion by quoting James Madison's statement during the Decision of 1789 and by noting that “Attorneys General in unbroken succession since at least the time of President Wilson” had opposed the use of such legislative vetoes.37 Johnson eventually signed corresponding legislation that contained a more modest, thirty-day waiting period.38 However, he again objected when Congress attempted to extend the waiting period to thirty days of continuous congressional session.39 Johnson expressed his doubts as to whether such a waiting period was reasonable and warned that his “responsibilities as President and Commander in Chief [would] require [him] to seek prompt revision of the restriction if future circumstances prove[d] it to be inimical to the national interest.”40

Thus, Johnson opposed the legislative veto more vehemently than any other previous president. Moreover, he consistently objected to congressional efforts to encroach upon his authority, and he resolutely asserted his control over all parts of the executive branch. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that there was no acquiescence in any diminution of the unitary executive during Lyndon Johnson's presidency.


(1) . Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant 76 (1998).

(2) . Vaughn Davis Bornet, The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson 25 (1983).

(3) . Dallek, supra note 1, at 138, 158–60.

(4) . Bornet, supra note 2, at 42–43.

(5) . Dallek, supra note 1, at 229.

(6) . Bornet, supra note 2, at 191, 196–97.

(7) . Id. at 207–08.

(8) . Id. at 220, 243.

(9) . Id. at 247–48, 351.

(10) . Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-556, 80 Stat. 689, 690 (1966).

(11) . Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2 Pub. Papers 980, 981 (Sept. 8, 1966).

(12) . Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-797, § 304, 80 Stat. 1479, 1497.

(13) . Statement by the President Expressing Disapproval of Appropriation Act Provision Relating to Export Control of Hides, Skins, and Leather, 2 Pub. Papers 1351, 1351 (Nov. 8, 1966).

(14) . Pub. L. No. 90-110, §§ 809, 810(a), 1001, 81 Stat. 279, 309–10.

(15) . Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1968, 2 Pub. Papers 935, 935 (Oct. 21, 1967).

(16) . Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964–65).

(17) . As we noted earlier, the jurisdictional basis of the nondiscrimination executive orders has traditionally been construed as resting on the executive power vested in the president by Article II. Contractors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that even if Executive Order 11246 was not statutorily authorized, it falls within the president's implied authority to act in the absence of a contrary statute). Some courts nonetheless persisted in viewing Executive Order 11246 as being based on the procurement statute. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466–67 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978); N.E. Constr. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760–61 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Contractors Ass'n, 442 F.2d at 171; Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Papermakers Local 189, 282 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. La. 1968); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. Dist., 249 N.E.2d 907, 909–10 (Ohio 1969). But see Cramer v. (p.488) Va. Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holding that the order was foreclosed by statute).

(18) . James E. Jones Jr., The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 341, 388–94; Earl M. Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 84, 102–09 (1970).

(19) . Interview with Jim Tozzi, former OMB, OIRA Deputy Administrator (June 14, 1983), cited in Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 1, 9 & n.19 (1984).

(20) . David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy 34 (2003).

(21) . Remarks at a Meeting with the Heads of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 1 Pub. Papers 18 (Dec. 3, 1963).

(22) . Circular No. A-67 (Bur. of Budget Aug. 28, 1964).

(23) . Dallek, supra note 1, at 134, 228, 313, 423, 444.

(24) . Pub. L. No. 88-257, 77 Stat. 844, 847 (1963).

(25) . Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Works Appropriations Act, 1 Pub. Papers 104, 104 & note (Dec. 31, 1963).

(26) . Pub. L. No. 88-638, 78 Stat. 1035.

(27) . Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act, 2 Pub. Papers 1249, 1250 (Oct. 8, 1964).

(28) . Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-643, § 201(a), 78 Stat. 1043, 1043.

(29) . Statement by the President Upon Approving Bill Authorizing a Retirement System for Certain Employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, 2 Pub. Papers 1336 (Oct. 14, 1964).

(30) Pub. L. No. 88-379, § 200, 78 Stat. 329, 331.

(31) . Statement by the President Upon Signing the Water Resources Research Act, 2 Pub. Papers 861, 862 (July 17, 1964). The provision was deleted by the Act of Apr. 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-404, 80 Stat. 129.

(32) . Veto Message (June 5, 1965), reprinted in 111 Cong. Rec. 12639 (1965).

(33) . Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 201(a), 79 Stat 1073, 1073 (1965).

(34) . Statement by the President Upon Signing the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act, 2 Pub. Papers 1082, 1082–83 (Oct. 26, 1965).

(35) . Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-796, 80 Stat. 1478 (amending the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-703, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 605, 608).

(36) . Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Amending the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 2 Pub. Papers 1354, 1354 (Nov. 8, 1966).

(37) . Veto of the Military Authorization Bill, 2 Pub. Papers 907, 907–08 (Aug. 21, 1965).

(38) . Military Construction Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 89-188, 79 Stat. 793, 818–19 (1965); Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization Act, 2 Pub. Papers 1003 (Sept. 16, 1965).

(39) . Military Construction Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 89-568, § 613(2), 80 Stat. 739, 757 (1966).

(40) . Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization Bill, 2 Pub. Papers 1008, 1008 (Sept. 12, 1966).