Democratic Checks on Courts
Democratic Checks on Courts
This chapter argues that European countries have generally felt the need to place legislative review in the hands of judges who are chosen through a procedure in which the democratic branches have an important say. As Pedro Cruz Villalon explains, the historical emergence of constitutional review was possible only because the bodies in charge acquired an intense democratic legitimacy. The problem, however, is that most European countries prefer a nonpolitical method to recruit the ordinary judiciary. The tendency in many nations is to protect better judicial independence through new arrangements that try to reduce the influence exerted by the political branches. The creation of a separate constitutional tribunal helps make it possible to have a more democratic procedure for appointing constitutional judges and to preserve the more bureaucratic or professional system for the rest of judges.
Keywords: legislative review, democratic branches, Pedro Cruz Villalon, constitutional review, judicial independence, constitutional tribunal
Yale Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
