Reason and the Sentiments
Reason and the Sentiments
Thinkers of the eighteenth century withdrew from Aristotelian formal logic. Smith himself needed something to replace this Aristotelian model of reasoning, especially since Hobbesian linear rationality proved to be inadequate for his needs. This chapter examines his alternative, arguing not simply that rhetoric is in itself a component of reasoning but that there is more. Smith did not completely reject Aristotle's logic, he only shifted its importance and limited its role.
Yale Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.