The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973
Craig Daigle
Abstract
In this analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the text draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of detente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War detente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, the book shows that the United Stat ... More
In this analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the text draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of detente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War detente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, the book shows that the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. The book further argues that as detente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.-Soviet relations.
Keywords:
Arab-Israeli War,
Arabs,
Israel,
Middle East,
Cold War,
detente,
U.S.-Soviet relations
Bibliographic Information
Print publication date: 2012 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780300167139 |
Published to Yale Scholarship Online: October 2013 |
DOI:10.12987/yale/9780300167139.001.0001 |